

works. Fichte uses it in the sense that all thought, all knowledge, and all philosophy rest upon the unity of consciousness, which cannot be demonstrated, but which is felt. In the sequel Schelling adopted the term as denoting the identity of a thinking subject with the object of its thought. This use of the term Fichte repudiated, and based upon it his emphatic denunciation of Schelling's system as distinguished from his own.

If, as I stated above, Kant took the first step from the metaphysical and dogmatic to the psychological treatment of the philosophical problem, Fichte took a further step. To him, even more distinctly than to Kant, the unity of knowledge exists and is to be realised in the inner region of self-consciousness. In Kant this Self appears only as the inner point of reference, the unity of apperception; in Fichte it appears as an active principle, as the first and fundamental act of a thinking mind. Self-consciousness is not merely a point of reference, it is an act of affirmation, of self-assertion.

It may here be remarked that the terminology employed by Fichte is unfortunate and misleading, more so even than that of Kant. In the use of the term "ich" (I or ego), we seem to be left in uncertainty whether by this term is meant the Self as one among other selves, or some condition of thought or feeling common to every thinking human being. In the latter sense no doubt Kant used the different terms of his analysis, such as Reason, Understanding, Imagination, &c. There was no attempt to take note of individual differences — in fact, Kant's analysis was ultimately founded upon the abstract psychology and logic of the