

was for a time his follower and fellow-worker, but he soon separated from him when it became necessary to give a more exact definition to the unifying principle which, as it seemed to him, was vaguely and unsatisfactorily conceived by Fichte as self-consciousness or expressed by the repellent term "ego." Schelling, among others, was early led to see the humorous side of Fichte's terminology, and he, as well as the literary society in which he moved, was hardly able to appreciate the moral force and strenuous character of Fichte's personality and doctrine. It seemed to them too rigid, and as such deficient from a poetical and artistic point of view. This want of sympathy led to an early estrangement, which found expression in polemical outbursts from both sides. The poetical side of Schelling's mind found satisfaction in Goethe's love of nature, in what may be termed the naturalism of Goethe's poetry. Schelling also came into contact with eminent naturalists, and was especially interested in the new discoveries by Galvani and Volta, as well as in Animal Magnetism, which seemed to promise unexpected insight into some of the mysterious phenomena of living matter. To Schelling's nature the philosophy of Fichte therefore appeared too abstract and logical, too rigorous and forceful: precisely the qualities which recommended it to minds of a different stamp and really secured for it a great personal influence.

Looking now at the ultimate philosophical problem, which, as I said before, did not present itself to Schelling with the religious interest it had for Kant and Fichte, the problem of the unity of thought and knowledge, we find the point which marks Schelling's