

principle, of that universal agency which in the sphere of the individual mind appears as conscious free will.

As stated above, the discovery, during that age, of animal electricity and magnetism seemed to open out an entirely new region of research wherein to explore and explain the phenomena of life. Thus it became for Schelling a necessity to look upon nature from a philosophical or idealistic point of view, and this was to be a counterpart to the purely realistic, empirical, and mechanical study of nature. Further, he found encouragement towards this undertaking in the spiritual side of Leibniz' philosophy and in Leibniz' doctrine of development, as he significantly points out in one of his earliest Tracts referring to the Fichtean form of philosophy (1797).<sup>1</sup>

We now see how the position occupied by Kant and prepared by British philosophy before him is gradually, almost imperceptibly, being abandoned. I said above that Kant among Continental philosophers took the first step in the direction of the psychological view of the great philosophical problem. We may now define this more exactly by saying that it was not psychological in the sense which the term conveys at the present day, mainly as a result of the independent and original psychological labours in this country. But it was a step in that direction, inasmuch as it was introspective. More than that: it was essentially self-reliant. It was so, not only in relation to the solution of the intellectual problem, but still more so in

<sup>1</sup> Schelling, 'Werke,' I., vol. i. p. 443.