

relation to the moral problem. And this, taken in a religious and higher ethical meaning, was the main interest and the main outcome of Kant's and Fichte's teaching; of the latter even more so than of the former, owing to the great part which Fichte played in the higher intellectual and educational work of the nation and the age. With him speculation had led to a philosophy of action. The characteristics of his nature were a strong will and character carrying through its intellectual and practical schemes with relentless logic and a rigorous moral instinct and purpose.

Fichte was unable from his strictly logical point of view to admit of that break of continuity which is demanded by the position on to which the mind of Schelling was gradually moving: the admission that you must look at things from two entirely different points of view, both equally legitimate, the external and the internal or introspective. His own rigorous logic had led Fichte up to the point where the light of consciousness emerges out of the night and darkness of the unconscious. At this point you must either be prepared to accept another and fundamentally opposed aspect or abandon as unintelligible the great world of external nature of which the introspective self after all forms only a part, in which it is — in the form of human individuals or persons — merely a special, though perhaps the highest and most interesting, phenomenon.

In choosing the former of these two possible courses, Schelling did no more than pay a tribute to the

<sup>24.</sup>  
Reintroduc-  
tion of  
dualism.