

common-sense view; but in doing so he also introduced again that dualism, that twofold way of looking at every phenomenon, which had, as it seemed, been overcome by the Kantian and Fichteian introspective or transcendental method.

The highest formal problem of philosophy, the unification of thought and of knowledge, upon which depended, according to the conviction of many of the foremost minds of that age, the solution of the religious problem, the establishment of a reasoned creed, seemed for the moment lost in uncertainty. A second and even more important problem arose accordingly out of the recognition of this dualism. An effort, it was felt, must be made to show that it did not indicate merely a point of indifference confronting the thinking mind with the unknowable and forcing it into a confession of ignorance. For such more modern conclusions that age, with its undaunted belief in the powers of the human intellect, was not ripe nor prepared. The conviction forced itself upon the philosophical thought of the age that this point of indifference, the identity of subject and object, afforded a glimpse into an underlying Unity, into the truly Real, a revelation of the Absolute. Accordingly Schelling introduces this idea into his system and conceives of the two sides of existence, of the life of nature and of the life of mind, as the unfolding of the underlying ground which he terms the Absolute, and which he further on identifies with the Divine principle. At this point he approaches the position classically represented by Spinoza's system; but at the same time