

the third, it is essentially anthropocentric or humanistic. In the course of the nineteenth century thought has moved from the first to the second, and is at the end of the century everywhere inclined in the direction of the third of these three positions.

We have seen how the first of these was the central problem in the idealistic systems; we have now to follow up the scientific movement in philosophy, which, as I said, had its origin likewise in Kant.

87.
Scientific
philosophy
in Germany.

The two thinkers who, for a time, represented almost alone in Germany scientific, as distinguished from religious philosophy, were Fries and Herbart. Both start directly and professedly from Kant. Fries had, at the same time, a distinct religious interest: he had been brought up in religious surroundings. Herbart, on the other side, never dealt exhaustively with the religious problem. He, even more than Fries, represents the realistic current of thought, and was for a time considered to be the strongest opponent of the idealistic movement. Beginning with Kant, he in the sequel assimilates ideas taken from the Leibniz-Wolffian school. Together with Fries he also introduced psychological analysis into the foundations of his philosophy.

But neither Fries nor Herbart succeeded in developing a system of philosophy in the sense of bringing the whole of their speculation under a governing idea, to a point of view from which the different philosophical problems could be methodically attacked. They were, even more than Kant, convinced that all knowledge is purely empirical, and that the philosophical treatment must either be confined to bringing out the different prin-