

but also in its contingent manifoldness and diversity. This contingent character, which in the idealistic systems appeared accidental and inexplicable, must have a uniting plan or meaning. It must be significant of some underlying purpose. But for us human beings such a plan or meaning finds its fullest expression in that which to us is of interest or value, in that which deserves to exist for its own sake and the realisation of which is the beginning, the purport, and the end of its existence. It has its psychological abode not so much in the intellectual as in the moral and emotional side of our nature.

42.
Philosophy
a reconcilia-
tion.

In this way Lotze considers it to be the task of philosophy to reconcile the results of experience and science with the demands of our emotional nature, or, in more philosophical terms, to show how the world of values or worths finds its realisation in the world of things. That such a reconciliation is possible is ultimately entirely a matter of belief. To uphold and cling to such belief in the face of the manifold contradictions and difficulties which life and experience present to us, and which philosophical reasoning can only very partially remove, is the real function of religious faith, and as such a resolution of the character.

In placing the idea of Personality in the centre, or rather in making it the sustaining foundation of his thought, Lotze really begins where the system of Hegel should have ended. That Hegel never arrived at a clear conception regarding this important point was a defect in his system which was pointed out by many of his followers and critics. From the side of the religious interest