

been brought into connection with that of Schopenhauer. In the opinion of German, and still more of foreign, historians of philosophy, he is to be classed amongst the great exponents of pessimism in modern thought. But though his earliest work, through which he attained a sudden celebrity hardly sustained in his later writings, gives a certain colour to this classification, the classification is more misleading than helpful. Von Hartmann was indeed influenced by Schopenhauer, and he, even more than the latter, upheld the opinion that an unbiassed examination of human life showed that the world contained more evil than good, more unhappiness and suffering than happiness and enjoyment. But as he, especially in his later writings, entirely opposes the eudæmonistic theory of morality, the inference he draws from this pessimistic view of the world and life does not lead him on to preach inaction, renunciation, and quietism, but rather the opposite — an energetic striving, a hopeful combat with evil. In this respect the doctrine of von Hartmann has only gradually become better understood. And in other respects he differs still more from Schopenhauer. He was well acquainted with modern German speculation, and his points of contact with Schelling, Hegel, and other prominent thinkers are quite as important as those with Schopenhauer; in fact, his philosophy may be regarded as a reconciliation of the truth contained in Hegel's with that contained in Schopenhauer's system. He fully understood the task which was implied in Schelling's later writings—the demand for a positive as complementary to a purely negative or formal

49.
Contrast
between
Schopen-
hauer and
von Hart-
mann.