

part of the philosophical interest of France and England has been till quite recently absorbed in this labour, it cannot be maintained that it has so far resulted in any systematisation comparable to that which is offered in the succeeding volumes of the 'Synthetic Philosophy.'¹

Spencer shares with Hegel the merit of having brought, in a definite form, the idea of development before the mind of recent thinkers. It is also interesting to note that both were, directly or indirectly, influenced by that complex of ideas which had found in Schelling and his immediate disciples an original but vague and fluctuating expression. These ideas Hegel deepened and reformed through his earlier theological, historical, and logical studies. Spencer approached them in the more definite form which they had acquired in the writings of eminent physiologists of his day, notably

states very clearly the fundamental conception of Ward's philosophy: "First, we found experience used in a double sense: there is the experience, the living experience, of a given individual, filled with concrete events and shaped from first to last by the paramount end of self-conservation and self-realisation. There is also experience generally — Experience with a capital E, the common empirical knowledge of the race, the result entirely of intersubjective intercourse, systematised and formulated by means of abstract conceptions. Next, we found grounds for suspecting that dualism has arisen from misconception and ignorance as to the relation of these two senses of experience. Experience in the first sense being relegated to psychology, experience in the second remained

as the sole business of natural science; and the one experience coming then to be regarded as exclusively subjective and the other as altogether objective, a clear line emerges between the two, and the dualism of Mind and Nature is the result. But now, in the third place, we have found that our primary, concrete experience invariably implies *both* subjective and objective factors, and seems to involve these, not as separable and independent elements, but as organically coöperant members of one whole. If they bear this character throughout, then logical distinction of these factors is possible but not their actual dismemberment; there is duality but no dualism." (Vol. ii. p. 152.)

¹ Certainly not within the period of this History.