

processes. When I first approached psychological problems I shared the general prejudice natural to physiologists, that the formation of sense-perceptions is merely the work of the physiological properties of our sense-organs. I learnt for the first time when studying the performance of the visual sense (especially as regards space-perception) to understand that act of 'creative synthesis' which gradually became for me a guide at the hand of which I could also gain a psychological comprehension of the development of the higher functions of imagination and intellect; for this the older psychology gave us no assistance. When I then approached the investigation of the time-relations in the sequence of our ideas a new insight was afforded me into the development of the functions of the will (viz., through the influence of preparation and tension upon the shortening of physiological time) . . . an insight likewise into the close connection of all such psychical functions as were separated through artificial abstractions and terms such as 'representing,' 'feeling,' and 'willing'; in one word, an insight into the indivisibility and the inner similarity of mental life in all its stages."¹

This passage is characteristic of Wundt's philosophy and differentiates it from that of Kant on one side, from that of Spencer on the other. Kant had recognised the synthetic function of the intellect, and had fixed upon the process of apperception as the centre of this mental synthesis. Wundt goes a step further, and defines it as a creative act which produces something more than a

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"Creative
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¹ See 'Philosophische Studien,' section in the second volume of 1894, pp. 122-124; also the first | Wundt's 'Kleine Schriften,' 1911.