

mere summation of separate elements or factors, and in this way he introduces into the mental process a feature unknown to Spencer and, as we saw above, wanting in his scheme of evolution. Wundt adopts Kant's term 'apperception,' but for him apperception is the first conscious exhibition of an active principle, which he identifies with the Will, and ultimately defines as the special characteristic of mental life. Something analogous to this principle he traces, though less and less perceptibly existing, even when we descend into the lower regions of animal life. The first main characteristic of this special factor is that it produces not only something new, but something which is continually on the increase; that it is a true principle of growth and development, not of mere rearrangement, of concentration and dissolution. There is, however, so far as I know, no evidence that the insufficiency of Spencer's special conception of development assisted Wundt in introducing into his scheme this enlarging feature.

The conception of this "creative synthesis," of Activity as the central characteristic of mental life and development, goes, with Wundt, hand in hand with the second doctrine peculiar to his philosophy. This doctrine is developed in his criticism of the ideas of substance and causality. It distinguishes his philosophy from the older ontology and metaphysics which, in modern times, have found their classical expression in the system of Spinoza. The conception of substance is not applicable, according to Wundt, to mental phenomena, *i.e.*, to the phenomena which we know through introspection. These are purely processes following each other in the sequence of time,