

Leibniz, had leavened most of the important systems of philosophy as well as the historical studies and general literature of the country.

To French thinkers neither the German nor the Spencerian notion of Evolution or development appeared generally satisfactory and conclusive. The logic of the former was too metaphysical and abstract to satisfy the demand for lucid expression so characteristic of the French mind. On the other side the great defect of Spencer's system, that it really contained no principle of progress, was early recognised by several prominent thinkers, and various corrective and enlarging attempts have been put forward: independently, as it seems, though not very far removed from ideas which are, in a more systematic form, contained in Wundt's writings. Even so far as the mere philosophical vocabulary is concerned, we find in the latter anticipations of titles and watchwords which have since attained a certain popularity and have become directive of philosophical thought.

In addition to this independent evolutionism, we find in French thought two other characteristics. Positivism, though not in the special sense in which it was understood by Comte, is, as it were, an abiding feature. Alongside of it we find prominently developed a tendency of thought which in the popular philosophic mind will always be identified with the name of Schopenhauer, who, in the title of his earliest great work, put the active principle or the Will into the foreground of his metaphysics. Though not in this abstract manner, this principle, which is known to us through introspection as an