

sensory and motor presentations, and of considering the emotional and volitional incidents as having the same reality as those of the senses and the intellect. The result was that the psychology of the latter had to go hand in hand with that of the former. The continuity, as well as the greater complexity of the field of consciousness, was brought out still more prominently and convincingly by the same thinker in the second volume of his Gifford Lectures referred to already.¹ We learn there that unity of thought and knowledge depends ultimately upon the continuity and unity of consciousness. The apparent dualism of an inner and outer world, to destroy which Kant led the way in his "unity of apperception," but restored again in his "Thing in Itself," is superseded in Ward's fundamental thesis that conscious mental life begins with the felt unity in duality of subject and object. Through it there arises within the individual consciousness by the active and selective process of attention, and by intercourse with other minds, the image of an outer world. This is not opposed to, but forms a portion of, the entire world of consciousness, but it acquires for practical purposes a seemingly independent existence, a reality of its own, supplying the material for orderly logical and scientific thought. All that we know, or can know, is comprised in the circumference of our individual consciousness enlarged through intersubjective intercourse into the greater sphere of general experience common to many minds. But if we, according to this view, do away with the common-sense aspect of things, according to which

¹ See *ante*, p. 156.