

sophic reasoning. This became more evident and more popularly known through the writings of Mach in Germany, of Clerk Maxwell, Clifford, and Karl Pearson in England. The manner also in which Tait in his popular Lectures and his polemics treated the notions of "Matter" and "Force," showing that both could be dispensed with in mechanical science, which could be built up with the measurable quantities of time, space, velocity, and inertia (capacity of motion), demonstrated the futility of building up a satisfactory philosophy upon the materialistic basis of *Kraft und Stoff*. However, the process of gradually eliminating the notions of "Vital Force," of "Force" and of "Matter" and "Substance" in the popular sense from the strict notation of science, had not only a negative, it had also a positive result: it led to various attempts to say what the mind really means by the discarded terms "Force" and "Substance," a process of criticism after the manner of Lotze. It gradually became clear that these terms, as well as the term "Life," imply something non-mechanical, denoting some psychical experience.

The fact that none of the expounders of the mechanical or naturalistic philosophy could dispense with one or more of these terms was a proof that some other than mechanical notions had to be covertly or surreptitiously introduced in order to build up a reasoned creed. Thus Herbert Spencer termed the underlying reality the Unknowable Power, and the mechanical principle which pervades the region of knowable things, Force; and Haeckel introduces the term "Substance." These three terms are intelligible to the human mind only through

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Inadequacy
of me-
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ideas.