

analyse the latter, notably so far as they appear to us to reveal the properties or qualities of external things. In the sequel he divided these sensations into two classes, which he regarded as indicating the primary and the secondary properties of things: for men of science had noted that many of the so-called properties were changeable, purely in the percipient and as it were accidental, and as it seemed did not affect the existence and nature of the things themselves which were extended, possessing figure, solidity, and the like. These latter, the primary qualities, he conceived as belonging to the things themselves, whereas the secondary qualities, such as colour, sound, temperature, taste, and smell, were merely the manner in which things affect us.

The next important step in following the psychological train of thought as distinguished from the dialectical, was taken by Bishop Berkeley, who showed that the primary qualities of Locke were no more than the secondary, known as independent of our personal sensations; that our ideas of them were equally elements in our thinking process; and that they therefore taught us nothing about matter—that is, about the independent substance of external things. In the further course of his speculations he consistently dropped the idea of Matter as quite unnecessary, inasmuch as things external existed for us only in our thoughts and ideas.