

daylight of what we term the outer world, or the half illuminated regions of our private personal experience.

But, when once he leaves pure introspective psychology, the philosopher will have much more difficulty in convincing the popular mind that these two regions deserve, in the same sense, the same epithet of reality. To convince my readers that the difference which common-sense asserts, and which a philosopher cannot deny, is not the primary state of things in our slowly acquired experience, it will suffice to consider for a moment what can possibly be the state of mind of an infant when awakening to the sensations of its earliest moments of existence. It certainly has no idea of what we term reality, for as Locke tells us, and everybody accepts, ideas are not innate or inborn, but follow definite sensations; and the range of sensations of an infant must be very small, consisting probably of feelings of comfort or discomfort, pain or pleasure, desire or satisfaction. Definite perceptions can only gradually present themselves in this small field of consciousness as the higher senses of sight, hearing, and touch become developed; they will emerge out of the chaos of indefinite feelings something like our experiences in the first moments when we awake out of sleep, or when, as we lie awake in a dark room, a dawn of light slowly discloses a variety of external objects with their colours, figures, and outlines. If this account of the dawn of consciousness is correct, we may ask the question what impressions, or clusters of impressions, are probably the first which distinctly appear and stand out within this general chaos of feelings and sensations.