

objects. What we may term the attribute of animation clings for a long time to many inanimate things.

But now we must register a further important experience in the child's mind; and this experience is the gradual perception of its own body.

Not until the child recognises the continual presence of this cluster of sensations, their proximity, and the fact that they cannot be got rid of, is it likely that a fairly definite contrast between the not-self and the self, the object and the subject, will arise and become the dominant feature in all succeeding experience. It is well known that children talk of themselves as definite outer beings before they learn to use the word I. The principal point which we should bear in mind is that what we term the not-self in the form of Personality must be an earlier experience than that of our own Self, although it will, to begin with, in the history of the child's mind, not appear as a not-self but only as a definite mark and vivid cluster of sensations, embedded in and surrounded by a confused halo or penumbra of indefinite feelings.

The moment when the child sees itself in its outer figure as standing among other similar figures, be they adults or other children, marks an epoch in its mental development. For not only does this bring perfect clearness between the "me" and the "not me," the self and other selves and things, but it throws into the background that less defined flow of experiences, feelings, and sensations, which really form, in their totality, the primordial content of the child's mind. From that moment, and probably increasingly so in the course of our life, we, in thinking of ourselves, unavoidably lay