

its body as a special image or centre of reference. Nor is it possible to say anything more about this special connection of the two than we are able to say about the connection of a part with the whole.

And yet we must answer the question, How does it come about that we are continually tempted, popularly, to look upon the flow of thought, the whole world of inner sensations, as contained within the body or a special part of it?

The explanation of this will be found in the fact that wherever any special object, that is, any definite sensation or cluster of sensations, belongs to that region of thought which possesses those attributes of clearness and definition which we term spatial, we are involuntarily driven to attach to it a higher degree of reality than to other experiences which are not thus connected. Thus, our body impresses us as being more real than the general flow of our thoughts and feelings.

And this impression is very much strengthened by the fact that, comparing ourselves with other persons, we can only deal with appearances in space.

Of other persons, we observe and know clearly only what their bodies show: although we are firmly convinced that these bodies represent or reveal an inner life, a flow of thought, similar to our own, we know of this only through inference from and analogy with our own inner experience.

And it is well known how extremely precarious and uncertain this process of judging by inference and analogy is, how it gives us only a very general view of the mind of others, and breaks down absolutely as soon as we attempt any minute description or analysis.