

to their abstractness. Limiting ourselves, however, to the three terms mentioned which designate the highest Ideals which the human mind is capable of, we may dwell with profit on some of the characteristics which they exhibit.

We may note, *inter alia*, the following: Words like True, Beautiful, and Good are used not only as adjectives marking the properties of things; they are also used as nouns when we speak of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Thus, truth, beauty, and goodness are not only adjectives and attributes, but are conceived by us as Reality, having a supreme existence, and we attach to them through this quality a highest value.

Then, again, these terms refer distinctly to two very different kinds of property or quality: they may refer, as it were, without any emotional colouring merely to external objects and their relations. Thus we say a ruler or a line is not true, meaning by this that it is not straight. We say of a mathematical formula that it is beautiful, or of a solution of a problem that it is pretty, and we use the term "good" to designate all kinds of properties which have no moral significance; notably in this way goodness is frequently used instead of usefulness.

At all times there have been serious attempts to reduce the meaning of these terms to what we may call prosaic or matter-of-fact relations between things and persons. Thus in philosophy, Truth has not infrequently been limited to mere "consistency of thought"; beauty has been reduced to utility, as when Hume headed one of his essays with the words "Why