

sonal observation, and can therefore not be described as belonging to our personal experiences, sensations, or thoughts, but which nevertheless must be taken into account if our ideas about them are to be correct or truthful. In fact only a very small portion of what constitutes for any one of us the outside world is derived from our personal experience. By far the larger portion is supplied to us from our infancy onward by other persons, in one form or another. In consequence of this, if we speak about things, including persons and relations, we really speak of an accumulated mass of observations and experiences by a large number of persons, with whom we have come into direct or indirect communication. This large mass of detail is arranged in the mind of each one of us in a certain order possessing a certain consistency and stability, *resulting in a more or less comprehensive image forming a whole*, of which, however, the small amount of purely personal experience, sensation, or thought which it contains, is, as it were, only the nucleus or crystallising centre. If we think of outside things, we do not think of them only as possessing what our very meagre personal acquaintance has furnished: we think of them as the integrated images which exist in the minds of our fellow-men. And even so far as our own experiences are concerned, we are in the habit of repeating the same many times before we are prepared to attribute to them external reality, and place them in the outer world. A single sensation or experience may indeed be so vivid and impressive, that without repetition and without the confirmation of other persons we may consider it to be real, that is, objective and not