

belong to what we call the outer World, but retain a purely personal existence. Thus we may in prose, and still more in poetry, call Pleasure or Pain, Faith or Doubt, Hope or Despair, Joy or Sorrow, Things, but in general when we talk of the World of Things we should not include such experiences. It would perhaps be better to speak of the World of Objects were it not that the word Object always calls up in our thoughts an opposite signified by the term Subject.

Some languages, such as the German, have a word to denote this objectivity without raising in the mind the thought of subjectivity. The word *Gegenstand* has been translated into English as Presentation, but as this term is likewise used to denote what in German is called *Vorstellung*, it is not very helpful for our purpose.

We have also seen in the foregoing that the notion of Reality as belonging to a certain portion of our individual experiences is capable of a further graduation, and that we speak of the truly Real as a higher order of some of the real things. The world which comprises the truly real or the great Verities, has in modern philosophical literature been termed the World of Values.

This World of Values, we have seen, is a creation of the human mind. We might with some propriety call it an invention or discovery of the human mind, as we are tempted to think of it as something which has existence independent of special individual minds, being a general possession, if not of all certainly of many minds, exhibiting thus one of the main characteristics of Reality. According to our view, however, this World of Values does not stand in opposition to the much larger World of Things which are indifferent—it occupies a scattered