

vient to the existence and exercise of those intellectual powers and moral feelings, which to a greater or less extent are possessed by many other animals as well as man. It is presumed at least that of the existence of intellectual powers or moral feelings in brutes no one can doubt, who has been at all accustomed to observe the characters and habits of animals<sup>u</sup>; so that when in common language it is asserted that man differs from other animals in possessing reason, while they are irrational, the term reason must be taken in its most extended sense, as implying the aggregate faculties of man, both moral and intellectual.

I will not here insist on the evidence of the intellectual powers of brutes, as deducible from the effects of what we call instinct; because in all those actions which are the result of instinct, animals appear to be guided by a natural and irresistible impulse from within, which leads them to seek or to avoid that which will be either useful or injurious to them; and enables them to perform the most complicated acts, as the building of a nest or the construction of a comb, though they may never even have seen the same acts performed by other individuals of

<sup>u</sup> Aristotle, in his History of Animals, distinctly affirms such an existence—*ἔνεστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἴχνη τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τρόπων, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει φανερωτέρας τὰς διαφορὰς.* p. 212. lin. 7—10. ed. Bekker.