defined, it must be very small: and were it, indeed, so defined, we should be sensible of it; which we are not. The law, therefore, seems to be, at all times, that the nearer to the centre of the eye, the greater is the sensibility to impression; and this holds whether we are looking abroad on the country, or are microscopically intent upon objects very minute.

When men deny the fine muscular adaptation of the eye to the sensation on the retina, how do they account for the obvious fact—that the eye-ball does move in such just degrees? how is the one eye adjusted to the other with such marvellous precision? and how do the eyes move together in pursuit of an object, never failing to accompany it correctly, be it the flight of a bird, or the course of a tennis-ball, or even of a bomb-shell? Is it not an irresistible conclusion—that if we so follow an object, adjusting the muscles of the eye so as to present the axis of vision successively to it, as it changes place, we must be sensible of these motions? for how can we direct the muscles unless we be sensible to their action? The question then comes, to be—whether being sensible to the condition of the muscles, and being capable of directing them with this extraordinary minuteness, this action of the muscles does not enter into our computation of the place of an object? But is not this exactly the same question recurring as when we asked—whether