| We may thus, with the greatest propriety, deny to the mechanical philosophers and mathematicians of recent times any authority with regard to their views of the administration of the universe; we have no reason whatever to expect from their speculations any help, when we attempt to ascend to the first cause and supreme ruler of the universe. But we might perhaps go further, and assert that they are in some respects less likely than men employed in other pursuits to make any clear advance towards such a subject of speculation. Persons whose thoughts are thus entirely, occupied in deduction are apt to forget that this is, after all, only one employment of the reason among more; only one mode of arriving at truth, needing to have its deficiencies complete by another. Deductive reasoners, those who cultivate science, of whatever kind, by means of mathematical and logical processes alone, may acquire an exaggerated feeling of the amount and value of their labours. Such employments, from the clearness of the notions involved in them, the irresistible concatenation of truths which they unfold, the subtlety which they require, and their entire success in that which they attempt, possess a peculiar fascination for the intellect. Those who pursue such studies have generally a contempt and impatience of the pretensions of all those other portions of our knowledge, where from the nature of the case, or the small progress hitherto made in their cultivation, a more vague and loose kind of reasoning seems to be adopted. Now if this feeling be carried so far as to make the reasoner suppose that these mathematical and logical processes can lead him to all the knowledge and all the certainty which we need, it is clearly a delusive feeling. For it is confessed on all hands, that all which mathematics or which logic can do, is to develope and extract those truths, as conclusions, which were in reality involved in the principles on which our reasonings proceeded. |
| [v] If
it is meant, that there is a "higher region" of evidence than that of
"mathematical proof and physical consequence," then it is in my opinion
utterly and completely erroneous; and as I am confident this erroneous
light will be that in which the statement will be understood by many, I
think it necessary to state distinctly what appears to me the relative
position of the subjects in discussion. ... [vii.] The first class of
truths (those of Pure Mathematics) appears to rest on
necessity. The second, (the Laws of Nature,) on necessity and our
external senses. The third, (those of Natural Religion,) on our external
senses and internal consciousness. The last, (those of Revelation,)
on human testimony. If they admit of any classification,
as subjects having a common resemblance, or as possessing
different degrees of evidence, I have placed them in the
only order which, in my opinion, is consistent with truth;
convinced that it is more injurious
to religion to overrate, than to undervalue the cogency of
the evidence on which it rests.
|
| [24] Many
excellent and religious
persons not deeply versed in what they mistakenly call "human
knowledge" but which is in truth the interpretation of those laws that
God himself has impressed on his creation, have
endeavoured to discover proofs of design in a multitude of apparent
adaptations of means to ends, and have represented the Deity as
perpetually interfering, to alter
for a time the laws he had previously ordained; thus by implication
denying to him the possession of that foresight which is the highest
attribute of omnipotence. [Here Babbage assumes that an omnipotent God would not design a universe in which he would choose to interfere. To use the analogy of a potter, an omnipotent God would cast his pots without the personal involvement of shaping them with his hands. This is, in my view, an odd notion of omnipotence. dcb] |
| [65] It is
time to point out to those who support what is called the literal
interpretation of Scripture, the precipice to which their doctrines, if
true, would inevitably lead; and to show, not by the glimmerings of
elaborate criticism, but by the plainest principles of common sense,
that there exists no such fatal collision between the words of
Scripture and the facts of nature. |
| [76] Let us
suppose all writings in the English, and indeed in all other languages
previous to the time of Shakespeare, to have been destroyed;—let us
imagine one manuscript of his plays to remain, but not a vestige of the
works of any of his contemporaries; and further, suppose the whole of
the succeeding works of English literature to be annihilated nearly up
to the present time. Under such circumstances, what would be our
knowledge of Shakespeare? We should undoubtedly understand the general
tenor and the plots of his plays. We should read the language of all
his characters; and viewing it generally, we might even be said to
understand it. But how many words connected with the customs, habits,
and manners of the time must, under such circumstances, necessarily
remain unknown to us! Still further, if any question arose, requiring
for its solution a knowledge of the minute shades of meaning of words
now long obsolete, or of terms supposed to be used in a strict or
philosophical sense, how completely unsatisfactory must our conclusions
remain! Such I conceive to be the view which common sense bids us take
of the interpretation of the book of Genesis. The language of the
Hebrews, in times long subsequent to the date of that book, may not
have so far changed as to prevent us from understanding generally the
history it narrates; but there appears to be no reasonable ground for
venturing to pronounce with confidence on the minute shades of meaning
of allied words, and on such foundations to support an argument opposed
to the evidence of our senses. |
| [92] The
object of the present chapter is to show that it is more
consistent with the attributes of the Deity to look upon miracles not
as deviations from the laws assigned by the Almighty for the government
of matter and of mind; but as the exact fulfilment of much more
extensive laws than those we suppose to exist. In fact, if we were
endued with acuter senses and higher reasoning faculties, they are the
very points we should seek to observe, as the tests of any hypothesis
we had been led to frame concerning the nature of those laws. [Babbage again shows his assumption that an omnipotent God would not create a universe in which he would choose to intervene, as intervention implies (to Babbage) an imperfection. - dcb] |
| [121] Hume
contends that a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. [Babbage disagrees -- arguing that a "computing engine" can anticipate any sequence of events. Just because empirical observation seems to identify simple laws, does not necessarily mean that the engine actually follows these laws without exception. See [168] cited below. dcb] |
| [167] The
great question of the incompatibility of one of the attributes of the
Creator—that of fore-knowledge, with the existence of the free exercise
of their will in the beings he has created,—has long baffled human
comprehension. [168] it is possible so to adjust the engine, that it shall change the law it is calculating into another law, at any distant period which may be assigned. |
| [252] the
small waves raised on the surface of the water, by the passage of a
slight breeze, are called Ripple; and a series of marks, very similar
in appearance, which are sometimes seen at low water on the flat part
of a sea-beach formed of fine sand, are called ripple-marks. Such marks
occur in various strata of stone, and at various depths below the solid
surface of the globe, and are regarded as evidence of their having been
formed beneath the sea. Similar appearances occur when a strong wind
drives over the face of a sandy plain, and are frequently seen upon the
surface of snow. [254] If, after the formation of ripple-marks at the bottom of a shallow sea, some adjacent river or some current deposit upon them the mud which it holds in suspension, then the first marks will be preserved, and new ripple marks may appear above them. Such is the origin of those marks we observe in various sand-stones, from the most recent down to those of the coal measures. |